Although integration has been a part of South American discourse for decades, the level at which it is actually promoted remains far from that which is observed in dynamic production and trading centers. Given transformations in global trade, the phenomenon of global value chains is, in fact, very regionalized. We ask whether the trading pattern of Mercosur countries is aligned with approaches based on regional value chain, and if not, how it differs and why. In our evidence and analysis, we primarily use traditional gross trade data and Trade in Value Added (TiVA) indicators, and we look more at countries' profiles. We show that there has been a decrease in Brazilian trade with Mercosur, with manufactured exports being the main reason for the decline. We indicate that, in addition to the effect of China in the 2000s, there has been a structural movement of Mercosur economies, mainly regarding Brazil, which supports a hypothesis of primarization or deindustrialization. Our results show that Brazil and Argentina are both relatively closed to foreign trade, as well as global and regional value chains, which makes them even more poorly integrated with one another. This reinforces what we call Mercosur's 'introspective' model of integration, making it less outward-oriented, which is divergent with what is observed when regional value chains are encouraged.
(*) http://dx.doi. org/10.1590/1981-3821201700030001 For data replication, see www.bpsr.org.br/files/archives/Dataset_Viola_Lima Authors are grateful to CNPq and CAPES for their respective grants. The authors also would like to thank the valuable comments from anonymous BPSR reviewers. strategies of engagement, whether in regional or global value chains. The benefits of value chains are asymmetric, and the most beneficial steps tend to be focused on intangible services and the production of higher value-added products. Likewise, ongoing technological revolutions can make global value chains even more regional, which tends to increase the importance of joint strategies with neighboring countries.
Insofar as Mercosur is an ambitious integration bloc, we ask whether the trading pattern of Mercosur countries aligns with the regional value-chain-based approach. If not, then how does it differ and why? We show that there has been a decrease in Brazil's trade with Mercosur, with manufactured exports being the main reason for the decline. We show that, besides the effect of China in the 2000s, there has been a structural movement of Mercosur economies, mainly regarding Brazil, which supports a hypothesis of primarization or deindustrialization. We stress that the logic of value chains sees regional integration as an important source of industrialization, as has been the case with the three major regions that have already become integrated: the European Union, North America, and East Asia. Our results, however, show that Brazil and Argentina are both relatively closed to foreign trade, as well as global and regional value chains, making them even more poorly integrated with one another. These facts reinforce what we call Mercosur's 'introspective' model of integration, making it less outward-oriented, which is divergent with what is observed when regional value chains are encouraged. We also emphasize that the current Mercosur situation represents some threats to long-term integration, and its members are drifting even farther away from the manufacturing competitiveness of advanced economies.
The article is divided into five sections (not including this introduction). First, we briefly describe the relation between regional value chains and industrialization.
Second, we provide an overview of Mercosur's performance, particularly the recent decrease in Brazil's trade with other countries in South America and Mercosur, emphasizing manufacturing exports and Mercosur countries' export baskets. Third, we show evidence of Brazil and Argentina closing themselves to foreign trade, and analyze their distinctiveness regarding value chain participation, shedding light on some hidden patterns. Fourth, we summarize our findings, relating them to the literature and analyzing Mercosur as a model of introspective integration. Finally, we provide our conclusion. (2017) 11 (3) e0001 -4/31
Regional value chains and industrialization
The fragmentation and dispersion of international production could only be globalized by the telecom and technology revolutions, using decreasing transport, transaction, and communications costs (BALDWIN, 2011) . The continuity of outsourcing and the transnationalization of activities by firms and governments gave rise to value chains at the global and regional levels. According to this logic, countries engaging in global and regional value chains specialize in outsourcing and transnationalization, aware of the high cost of producing goods entirely within their borders.
But the gains from value chains are asymmetrical, and greater benefits come from both the beginning and the end of the production process, as shown in the 'smiling curve'
in Figure 01 , which represents the production of electronics or machinery. These extremes concentrate advanced services, which could be applied to the manufacturing process, and have scale gains from expanding production, and are also tradable.
Nevertheless, quality services require medium-and high-skilled human labor, as well as a business environment that enables information, technology, and research firms to expand (OECD, 2013; STURGEON et al., 2013) . According to the OECD (2013), the way in which value chains affected trade policies was unique in history. Protectionism became costlier, as tariffs are cumulative when intermediate goods are exchanged across borders countless times. As a result, more expensive inputs discouraged countries and their firms from becoming inserted into a transnational value chain (OECD, 2013) . In this sense, some regions recognized the cost (2017) 11 (3) e0001 -5/31 of protectionism decades ago. A common fact within practically the entirety of East Asia is the low protection level for semi-processed products, which enabled production complementarity (BAUMANN, 2013; ESTEVADEORDAL, BLYDE, and SUOMINEN, 2013) .
Moreover, value chains change perceptions about development and business strategies, as well as industrial, commercial, and foreign policy options.
These trade patterns are an opportunity for the industrial development of lateindustrializing countries, such as Brazil because they allow emerging countries less time to catch up to developed countries (OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD, 2013) . Brazil has niches of global competitiveness, such as the production of medium-sized aircraft, agribusiness, iron ore, and oil exploration in deep waters. But the sustainability of these (and other) sectors depends on a recognition of the opportunity to foster processes of productive complementarity and advances in service areas.
Brazil has three options regarding the challenges and opportunities facing these international value-added standards, and all of them are complex. The first is to create its own chains, a very difficult challenge given Brazil's deficit in infrastructure and technology; it would need decades to build a solid chain. In addition, this option tends to neglect the opportunities of spreading production internationally, such as lower production costs, and more competitiveness. The second option is to join the existing chains or to improve its position in chains in which Brazil is already a member. The third is to build competitive production chains at the regional level. We believe that the third option, combined with elements of the first two, tends to have more gains over time because this was the path followed by other nations in North America, Western Europe, and especially East Asia (BALDWIN, 2011) .
Global value chains are, in fact, a very regionalized phenomenon. The 'geographical component' is a common feature of value chains; countries often develop trade at the regional level through mechanisms such as productive complementarity, preferential trade agreements, and investment agreements (BALDWIN, 2013; ELMS and LOW, 2013) . As demonstrated by Estevadeordal, Blyde, and Suominen (2013) , physical distance between countries reduces the chances of them forming a productive chain, and in turn, substantially decreases foreign added value. As per the authors' empirical model, "a 10% increase in distance reduces the average foreign value added by about 67%", as the "participation in the same preferential trade agreement (PTA) increases the average foreign value by 15%" (ESTEVADEORDAL, BLYDE, and SUOMINEN, 2013, pp.15 ).
(2017) 11 (3) e0001 -6/31
Therefore, it would be in the interest of countries that are far from the main centers of the global value chains (GVC) to seek to develop their own regional value chains, especially when considering the high cost of putting together 'full' national value chains (unless one can create prospective positive visions of large-scale automation and reshoring).
The 21 st -century literature draws attention to this aspect in the form of regional integration networks in terms of production and trade. It usually defines the central country as a hub and smaller partners as spokes (BALDWIN, 2011; BAUMANN, 2013; IAPADRE and TAJOLI, 2013 
___________________________________________________________________________
1 The Andean Community is a South-American bloc made up of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Chile is inside the 'others' category. The Andean Community has lost some strategic importance as an integration bloc after the creation of the Pacific Alliance in 2011, which is made up of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, all of which are countries committed to free trade within the bloc and large, wide-ranging agreements. However, we use the term 'Andean Community' as it is still used in official Brazilian statistics, since our focus in this article is on Mercosur and South America, not necessarily its divisions, which will be addressed in other articles. As per MDIC data, in 2015, approximately 80% of Brazil's exports to South America, and around 86% of its exports to Mercosur (81%, when including Venezuela)
were manufactured goods. This percentage is much higher than it is for exports to other regions. In addition to geographic proximity, the preferential trade agreements within the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and Mercosur can explain this high concentration. Latin America absorbs more than a third of Brazilian manufactured exports. The regional market is central to Brazil's economy, but one must question the ___________________________________________________________________________ 2 We use 'aggregate factors' to analyze export components, as reported by Brazilian official statistics. Basic products are those that are close to the state in which they are found in nature, i.e., with a low degree of elaboration, such as mining and food products. Semi-manufactured products (such as raw sugar, semi-manufactured iron products, and pulp) are industrialized products that are not in their form of use, either final or intermediate, because they must go through another production process to become a manufactured product. long-term sustainability of these value-added exports because South America is a moderately small market in the context of global GDP.
When we consider this decline in trade, however, one could argue that a wideranging phenomenon is taking over the global economy. Low GDP growth and stagnant productivity in the developed world have led to some of these effects on emerging Since Uruguay and Paraguay are small economies, the trade dynamics of Mercosur -and much of South America -has mainly been due to the performance of the Brazilian and Argentine economies, which we discuss in the next section.
Brazil and Argentina and value-added trade dynamics
Along with the development of value chains' over the last few decades, there has also been a proliferation of regional agreements, encouraging regionalism as well as globalization. Regional markets are traditionally a primary source of trade activity, and even with information and communications technologies -(ICT) advances, geographic proximity is still a valuable factor in the development of value chains since the degree of integration already existing between countries helps establish trust in international projects. Besides traditional trade statistics, the value-added approach provides insights into actual exchanges between economies within international production chains, as we can see in the cases of Brazil and Argentina.
In the traditional industrial sense, Argentina dramatically reduced its For Brazil and Argentina, exports of manufactured goods to Mercosur (68.2%
and 66%, respectively) in 2014 were double those to the world at large (33.3% and 31.2%). This difference shows the importance of Mercosur for the manufactured goods exports of both countries-perhaps even a dependence. In this context, one must question the sustainability of these exports in a world undergoing great commercial and productive transformations, which demands greater competitiveness outside one's region. In this sense, it is important to be competitive in international terms in order to sustain national production, as is supported by East Asia's experience (BAUMANN, 2013; BHAGWATI and PANAGARIYA, 2013) .
These changes include value-added trade, which has promoted value chains at the global and (increasingly) regional levels. With the fragmentation and dispersion of international production, exported and locally consumed products and services begin to contain more external elements, which reflects the degree of integration in today's global economy, especially for products with the most value added. One important expression of this integration is the degree to which gross exports are 'foreign valueadded', defined by the WTO as the "content of exports that corresponds to the value added of inputs that were imported to produce intermediate or final goods/services to be exported" (WTO, 2016, pp. 83) . Figure 07 shows the foreign value-added share of gross exports to the 19 countries of the G20 -the 19 largest economies in the world, as well as the European Union -for 2011, the last year available through the TiVA database. We combined these figures with total imports as a share of GDP. Another taxonomy of economic integration relates to the 'direction' of trade and production flows: 'backward' and 'forward participation'. Backward participation relates to upstream links, i.e., the foreign value-added and inputs included in a country's exports. Forward participation has to do with domestic value-added and inputs included in 'other' countries' exports (OECD and WTO, 2016) . Regarding the technological transformation of products and their complexity, backward participation of a country tends to imply more manufacturing, and require primary products from other countries.
As shown in Table 01 , Brazil and Argentina both show high domestic valueadded in exports compared to a global average of around 75% in 2011. There are interesting differences between the two countries concerning this; the domestic valueadded that is 're-exported' (i.e., the embedded exports in other countries' exports to third countries) are considerably larger for Brazil-24.5% of total exports, slightly (2017) Argentina has shown a more nationalist pattern in regards to direct domestic value-added. Although Brazil's total domestic value-added is higher than Argentina's, Argentina's exports include 69.4% of 'direct' domestic VA, while Brazil has 64.6%. In addition to the application of local content, one of the factors that helps explain this difference is that Argentina has fewer minerals and fuels than Brazil, and these sectors tend to be processed as intermediary goods for producing final goods. The 'reimported' value is practically zero for both countries, reinforced by the fact that both countries' imports are a very small part of GDP, as shown in Figure 07 .
Another way to illustrate these value-added data is displayed in Figure 08 .
Both Brazil and Argentina are below the average rate of participation in global value chains for both developed and developing countries. Argentina has more balance in its forward participation (re-exports in domestic value-added) and backward participation (foreign value-added), but in general, the country is below Brazil in this regard. In the Brazilian case, the very low backward participation rate seems contradictory for an economy that wanted to internationalize and export valueaggregate products, as was expressed in its plans for productive development policies.
The two most industrialized countries in South America, and the pillars of MERCOSUR integration, show marked differences regarding the two types of participation in value-added trade. As shown, Brazil does not import as many intermediate components and goods from other countries to add value to its exports (only around 10.7%, less than the half of the average for developing countries).
Meanwhile, its largest regional partner does not export as many components and We argue that the logic of Brazil-Argentina integration, given the current trade flows and sizes of the economies, makes little sense regarding the rationale of value chains, which could threaten the trade sustainability of Mercosur. Concerning the productive logic in the formation of regional value chains, one would expect 'high levels of backward participation for Brazil', and 'high levels of forward participation for Argentina', as this process would guarantee greater productive integration and take advantage of the complementarities in their economies. The emphasis on exports' complementarity combined with harmonized business cycles was critical for East Asian countries to establish high levels of productive and trade integration, as well as reasonable levels of growth, over the last few decades.
However, this process would not be easy for Mercosur. Some commitment to reduce national sovereignty would be needed from both countries as they re-thought industrial autonomy and how to deal with special interests, which tend to favor protection from imports (even inside Mercosur). Likewise, following the regional value chain pattern, Brazil, as the larger economy, would be expected to play the role of the hub in the regional production process, and Argentina would play the role of a spoke. But when we are dealing with two very closed economies, as our evidence shows, a long-term plan oriented toward developing Mercosur could be a better Source: OECD Tiva, 2015. Notes: (*) As a % share of total exports of domestic inputs sent to third countries. (**) As a % share of total foreign content of exports. The absence of more technologically complex sectors in backward participation Conversely, the three regions that are most integrated, as well as the world average, have shown a downward trajectory in adopting tariffs.
___________________________________________________________________________
Besides all the 'material' questions analyzed, structural changes in the global economy made the competitiveness of the services sector more important in comparison to other sectors, becoming an almost inseparable part of many manufacturing segments, especially for advanced manufacturing. The logic of value chains, whether global, regional, or national, shows that in many production processes, the value-added concentrates the most in the services sector, both in pre-production (such as research and development) and post-production stages (such as marketing) (OECD, 2013).
The push for globalization by various economies through foreign direct investment, trade promotion, technology diffusion, and political openness in the 1990s helps us understand part of the decline in the value-added concerning traditional manufacturing. Advanced economies have specialized in R&D, innovation, concept and product design, and marketing services, while many production and assembly activities have moved to countries and regions that offered tax benefits and advantages in low-cost production. These innovation advances are some of the factors that could make one argue that de-industrialization is not taking place in advanced countries because service sector appreciation (many of services being tradable across international borders) is a key variable in the reducing the portion of GDP destined to manufacturing in market price terms.
Services make up a considerable share of total exports for the world as a whole, and for Brazil and Argentina, the value-added content of service exports diverge from this pattern once again. Brazil has a large share of domestic services in both types of aggregated exports, while Argentina adds more foreign value ( Figure 09 ). As for the supply of components and intermediate goods (Table 03) , Brazil is the largest provider of services for Argentine exports, both for total exports and manufacturing exports. For Brazil, the United States is the main supplier of services for exports. regional trade among countries in Mercosur" in comparison to other regional or global value chains (FERRAZ, GUTIERRE and CABRAL, 2015, p. 15) .
Using network analysis, Iapadre and Tajoli (2014) show some patterns of trade regionalization. According to them, the relations between the 'hub' (largest economy) and the 'spokes' (smaller economies) establish two main standards of leadership: those of 'export hubs' and 'local suppliers'. The export hub model arises when the preference of the larger economy (hub) for intra-regional trade is higher for imports than for exports, which "can be the result of regional production networks, in which final products made of inputs produced in different spokes are exported by the hub country to the rest of the world" (IAPADRE and TAJOLI, 2014, p. 95) . Otherwise, the local supplier model is a more 'inward-looking' regional integration pattern, in which the countries' aspirations for competitive global insertion becomes a more difficult task. For hubs in the local supplier pattern, intra-regional trade preference is higher for exports than for imports. According to the authors, " [t] his can be the result of the leader country attracting FDI and related imports of intermediate goods, which are used to produce final goods for the entire regional market" (IAPADRE and TAJOLI, 2014, p. 95) . Brazil has a leadership pattern closer to the dominant 'local supplier' model because Mercosur has been largely built around Brazil's capacity to export to the region. Brazil, however, is not as big an importer in the regional context, while its exports appear to be "fed by imports coming predominantly from the rest of the world" (IAPADRE and TAJOLI, 2014, p. 107) .
As Baumann (2013) Summarizing what we have found, we note that there is a declining trend in manufacturing exports in Mercosur, which is reinforced by a China effect. Some aspects (2017) Much research needs to be done about manufacturing performance, including output (in constant terms and productivity) and the role of exchange rates in re-primarization.
There are also many other variables that could explain the lack of integration in Mercosur, particularly with sectoral analysis. Nonetheless, this article aims to contribute to the contemporary analysis of Brazil and Argentina and increase debate about the integration of Mercosur, a trading bloc that could be a mechanism for increasing joint competitiveness, but as of yet still is not.
Final Considerations
After more than six decades of efforts to promote regional integration, Latin America still has a lot of work ahead of it to see major economic breakthroughs. The consistent evaluation of the economic gains from policies of joint competitiveness is needed in order to improve the intensity and quality of integration.
The high domestic content in Brazil and Argentina's exports reflects the countries' low participation in international processes of productive complementarity, as well as large domestic restrictions on imports. The fact that both countries have not barriers will largely depend on the main regional leaders and the degree to which the countries of the region can build a consensus between civil society, entrepreneurs, national governments, and, in the case of Brazil and Argentina, the subnational governments of the biggest states and provinces.
Mercosur also faces institutional difficulties, many of them due to the strong reluctance of Brazil and Argentina to partially abdicate national sovereignty to the integration project, as evidenced by the demonstrated high degree of closure of both economies. Macroeconomic difficulties were, and to some extent, still are, obstacles to progress in integration both inside and outside the bloc. Increasing trade in value-added also requires greater emphasis on regional trade agreements that insert 'new issues' into their projects far beyond tariff reductions, such as services, government procurement, intellectual property rights, and sustainability standards.
Brazil must work to reduce its own asymmetries as well as the asymmetries between Mercosur countries, both of which are factors that hinder integration. We believe, however, that these actions require structural integration, the harmonization of business cycles, productive complementarity, and greater attention to services as a source of competitiveness. The FOCEM -Fund for the Structural Convergence of Mercosur-has been insufficient for dealing with the reduction of asymmetries, thanks mostly to its extremely poor budget for addressing historical inequalities. Perhaps encouraging regional value chains to improve economic competitiveness could be an alternative to economic growth in the region, as well as job creation and long-term social prosperity.
One problematic factor is that Brazil and Argentina are rethinking part of their protectionist policies and becoming more politically engaged in opening up commercially to the world, but at a time when the economy and global trade are growing slowly (2017) 11 (3) e0001 -28/31 compared to in previous decades, and nationalist-protectionist movements have been rising in developed economies. All of this increases the importance of Brazil and Argentina working together to find economic complementarities.
Nevertheless, we have two central observations to make. First, there is some evidence that global value chains seem to have 'peaked', just like global trade itself, in 2012. Second, new production technologies, such as 3D printers and second-generation robotics, make it more plausible that countries could bring back some stages of the production process back home (BRYNJOLFSSON, McAFEE, and SPENCE, 2014) . These first two facts make GVC evolution somewhat more uncertain, as well as the possibility of some disruption, which could make regional value chains more feasible. We would like to stress, however, that this is a not a reason for Mercosur countries to not make progress in integration, as the pattern of integration could be transformed quite soon. Most of the time, there is a big price to pay for not following the tendencies of the global economy.
What is a new pattern can become obsolete faster than it takes for decision makers'
perceptions to change, especially in such a complex world.
Lastly, the fact that South American countries have shown low rates of GDP growth since 2013 could be related to the relatively low participation of more valueadded products in their export baskets, as manufacturing and services. As we showed, regional integration can be an important source of industrialization, mainly for developing countries, which could enjoy a comparative advantage in searching for productive complementarities in order to become more competitive on the global market.
Without returns of scale, the manufacturing sector might not even survive.
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